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Abstract
This paper investigates differentially private analysis of distance-based outliers. The prob-
lem of outlier detection is to find a small number of instances that are apparently distant from
the remaining instances. On the other hand, the objective of differential privacy is to conceal
presence (or absence) of any particular instance. Outlier detection and privacy protection are
thus intrinsically conflicting tasks. In this paper, instead of reporting outliers detected, we
present two types of differentially private queries that help to understand behavior of outliers.
One is the query to count outliers, which reports the number of outliers that appear in a given
subspace. Our formal analysis on the exact global sensitivity of outlier counts reveals that
regular global sensitivity based method can make the outputs too noisy, particularly when the
dimensionality of the given subspace is high. Noting that the counts of outliers are typically
expected to be relatively small compared to the number of data, we introduce a mechanism
based on the smooth upper bound of the local sensitivity. The other is the query to discovery
top-h subspaces containing a large number of outliers. This task can be naively achieved by
issuing count queries to each subspace in turn. However, the variation of subspaces can grow
exponentially in the data dimensionality. This can cause serious consumption of the privacy
budget. For this task, we propose an exponential mechanism with a customized score function
for subspace discovery. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first trial to ensure
differential privacy for distance-based outlier analysis. We demonstrated our methods with
synthesized datasets and real datasets. The experimental results show that out method achieve
better utility compared to the global sensitivity based methods.
Keywords: Differential privacy, Outlier detection, Smooth sensitivity and Exponential mech-
anism
1 Introduction
Machine learning and data mining technologies are now becoming increasingly influential in
our daily life. When data mining is processed over personal data collected from individuals, the
acquired knowledge might be used to infer private information. Differential privacy is a recent
notion of privacy tailored to the problem of releasing statistical information [1]. Differential
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privacy for statistical queries of various types, such as average, sum, variance, histogram,
median, and maximum likelihood estimator, have been investigated [1, 2, 3].
As described in this paper, we investigate differentially private outlier analysis. Outlier
detection is a task to identify instances that are apparently distant from the remaining instances.
The objective of differential privacy is to prevent adversaries from learning of the presence (or
absence) of any particular instance from released information. Outlier detection and privacy
protection are therefore intrinsically conflicting tasks. It presents a challenging difficulty.
To overcome this difficulty, instead of identifying outliers, we consider reporting statistical
aggregation on outliers that helps to recognize the occurrence of anomalous situations, with a
guarantee of differential privacy. More specifically, we examine differentially private queries
of three types for outlier analysis. One is a query to count outliers that appear in a given
subspace. Second is a query to discover the top-h subspaces containing numerous outliers.
Third is a query to detect the top-h outliers are that more likely.
1.1 Related Works
We introduce existing studies of privacy aspects of outlier analysis. Secure multiparty compu-
tation (SMC) is a cryptographic tool that facilitates the evaluation of a specified function over
their private inputs jointly, while maintaining these inputs as private. One earlier study[4] intro-
duced an SMC for distance-based outlier detection from horizontally and vertically partitioned
private databases using random shares. One earlier study [5] investigated an SMC for spatial
outlier detection. Another report of a study [6] presented an SMC for distance-based outlier de-
tection with the Mahalanobis distance. Another study [7] presented an SMC for density-based
outlier detection. The objective of these works is to detect outliers securely without mutually
sharing privately distributed data; privacy invasion caused by observing detected outliers is not
considered.
Studies of differential privacy for outlier analysis are few, presumably because of its intrin-
sic difficulty, as described. Only one report in the literature [8] describes a study that considers
the differential privacy of outlier analysis. This study was conducted to detect anomalous
changes from a time series under a guarantee of differential privacy. The objective of this
study is closely related to ours, whereas this method releases a one-dimensional time series
with differential privacy; outlier detection is applied to the released data as a post process.
Consequently, the approach differs from ours.
[9] introduced a novel privacy notion, outlier privacy, as a generalization of differential pri-
vacy. Outlier privacy measures an individual’s privacy parameter by how much of an “outlier”
the individual is. The objective of this study is to define privacy using the notion of outliers,
but not for differentially private outlier analysis.
1.2 Our Contribution
In this paper, we present a methodology for distance-based outlier analysis with guarantee
of differential privacy. Our proposal consists of two different types of differentially private
queries.
Differentially private counting of outliers. This query reports the number of outliers that
appear in a given subspace. Since the global sensitivity of counts of outliers is very large, the
resulting outputs can be too noisy. We focus on the observation that the counts of outliers are
expected to be relatively small compared to the number of data in typical datasets. Taking
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advantage of this, we develop a randomization mechanism for counts of outliers based on
the smooth upper bound of the local sensitivity [2]. Randomization mechanism based on the
smooth upper bound typically have better utility because of its data dependency; however, its
evaluation is often costly. To alleviate this, we provide an efficient algorithm for evaluation of
smooth upper bound for counting outliers.
Differentially private discovery of subspaces. This query finds top-h subspaces contain-
ing a large number of outliers. This task can be naively achieved by issuing count queries to
each subspace in turn. However, the variation of subspaces can grow exponentially in the data
dimensionality. This can cause serious consumption of the privacy budget. For this task, we
employed the exponential mechanism. We specifically design a score function for subspace
discovery which is insensitive to the size of the subspace set. Because of this insensitivity, the
proposed mechanism achieves better detection accuracy even with high dimensionality.
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first trial to ensure differential privacy for
distance-based outlier analysis. We demonstrated our methods with synthesized datasets and
real datasets. The experimental results show that our methods achieve better utility compared
to the global sensitivity based methods.
2 Differential Privacy
LetX = {x1,x2, . . . ,xN} ∈ DN be a database. An analyst issues a query f : DN → T ; then
the database returns an output, where T denotes the range of the outputs. Differential privacy,
a recent notion of privacy, measures the privacy breach of database X caused by releasing
output t ∈ T with no assumptions of the background knowledge of adversaries. The outputs
are typically modified using a mechanism A : DN → T before release to preserve differential
privacy.
Let H(X,X ′) = |{i : xi 6= x′i}| denote the Hamming distance, the number of different
records in X and X ′. If H(X,X ′) = 1, then it can be said that X and X ′ are neighbor
databases, or X ∼ X ′ shortly. In the following, we presume |X| = |X ′| = N . Then, (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy is defined as shown below.
Definition 1 ((ǫ, δ)-Differential Privacy). Mechanism A guarantees (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy
if, ∀X ∼ X ′ and ∀T ⊆ T ,
Pr[A(X) ∈ T ] ≤ eǫPr[A(X ′) ∈ T ] + δ.
The parameter ǫ and δ are designated as privacy parameters. Randomization based on the
global sensitivity is the most straightforward realization of differential privacy for continuous
outputs [1]. The exponential mechanism is a natural extension for discrete outputs [10]. We
use both mechanisms for our method, which is explained in detail in the next subsection.
2.1 Sensitivity-based Method
2.1.1 Global Sensitivity
Presuming that the output domain of query f is continuous, then randomization based on the
global sensitivity [1] provides a mechanism that guarantees differential privacy for queries of
any type, as long as its global sensitivity is evaluable. The global sensitivity is defined as
explained below.
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Definition 2 (Global Sensitivity). Letting D be the domain of data, the global sensitivity of
query q : DN → Rd is given as
GSq = max
X∼X′
‖q(X)− q(X ′)‖2,
where ‖ · ‖2 denotes ℓ2 norm of vectors.
Given the global sensitivity for a specified query, randomization by a normal distribution
based on the global sensitivity guarantees (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, as stated by the following
theorem.
Teorem 1 (Gaussian Mechanism by Global Sensitivity [10]). Let GSq be the global sensitivity
of a query q : DN → Rd. Then, mechanism A that randomizes the output of the query by eq.
(1) provides (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy
Aq(X) = q(X) + Y, (1)
where Y ∈ R denotes a noise in which Y is an sample drawn from the Gaussian distribution
with mean 0 and variance GS
2
q ·2 log (2/δ)
ǫ2
.
2.1.2 Smooth Sensitivity
For some functions, the global sensitivity can be impractically large even when the sensitivities
are small with almost all neighboring pairs. This large sensitivity occurs because it is evaluated
as the greatest difference of outputs among many possible neighboring pair of databases. For
example, the global sensitivity of median is N , the whole sample size, but this arises only in
a pathological situation [2]. Randomization base on the smooth sensitivity enables the use of
moderate sensitivity for such sensitive queries. For a given database X, the local sensitivity is
defined as the greatest difference of outputs for ∀X ′ s.t. X ′ ∼ X.
Definition 3 (Local Sensitivity). Let D be the domain of the data. Then, the local sensitivity
of query q : DN → Rd is given as
LSq(X) = max
X′:H(X,X′)=1
||q(X) − q(X ′)||.
It is noteworthy that that GSq = maxX∈DN LSq(X). Nissim et al. [2] presented the
smoothed sensitivity, which is a class of smooth upper bounds to the local sensitivity.
Definition 4 (Smooth upper bound). For β > 0, a function Sβ : Dn → R+ is a β-smooth
upper bound on the local sensitivity of query q if it satisfies the following requirements:
∀X ∈ Dn, Sq,β(X) ≥ LSf (X);
∀X ∼ X ′, Sq,β(X) ≤ eβSq,β(X ′).
The smallest function satisfying Definition 4 is the smooth sensitivity of q:
Definition 5 (Smooth Sensitivity). Given β > 0, the smooth sensitivity of query q : DN → Rp
is
S∗q,β(X) = max
X′∈DN
(LSq(X
′) · e−βH(X,X′)).
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[2] also showed that adding noise proportional to the smooth sensitivity yields a private
output perturbation mechanism if the noise distribution satisfies some properties. The differ-
ential privacy of a Gaussian mechanism realized by the smooth sensitivity can be stated by the
following theorem.
Teorem 2 (Gaussian Mechanism by Smooth Sensitivity [2]). Let Y be a noise generated from
the Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and variance 1. Let Sq,β be a β-smooth upper bound
of query q. Then, if α = ǫ
5
√
2 ln 2/δ
and β = ǫ4(p+ln 2/δ) , mechanism A guarantees (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy:
Aq(X) = q(X) + Sq,β(X)
α
· Y.
2.2 Exponential Mechanism
The sensitivity-based method basically presumes that outputs of the target query are real-
valued. The exponential mechanism is a natural extension of the sensitivity-based method
to discrete outputs. Intuitively, the exponential mechanism relies on a utility function u :
DN ×R → R that outputs a larger value if the input to the utility function is close to the true
output. With this utility function, output values that are closer to the true output are likely to be
provided by the exponential mechanisms, and vice versa. The sensitivity of the utility function
is defined as presented below.
Definition 6 (Sensitivity of a utility function u). Let D be the domain of data, and let u :
DN ×R → R be a utility function. Then, the sensitivity of u is given as
∆u = max
r∈R
max
X,X′∈DN :H(X,X′)=1
||u(X, r) − u(X ′, r)||.
Given the sensitivity of a utility function, randomization of outputs following Theorem 3
guarantees ǫ-differential privacy.
Teorem 3 (Exponential Mechanism [11]). Let ∆u be the sensitivity of utility function u :
DN × R → R. Then, mechanism ǫǫu,∆u that randomizes the output of the query by eq. (2)
provides 2ǫ∆u-differential privacy
Pr[ǫǫu,∆u(X) = t ∈ R] =
exp(ǫ · u(X, t))∫
R exp(ǫ · u(X, r))dr
. (2)
3 Problem Statement
Our objective is to analyze outliers contained in a private database in a differentially private
manner. Outlier detection is a problem to identify a point that is significantly distant from
other points. Hence, the result of outlier detection is essentially privacy invasive; privacy pro-
tection and outlier detection have conflicting objectives. In order to reconcile the contradicting
goals, we investigate two tasks, (1) counting outliers in a given subspace and (2) discovering
subspaces containing many outliers, under the constraint of differential privacy.
Subspace discovery for outlier analysis has been investigated as a major topic of outlier
detection [12, 13, 14]. The major motivation of existing subspace discovery methods was ba-
sically tackling the high dimensionality. Full-space outlier analysis might fail to detect outliers
found only in specific sub-spaces because of a large number of irrelevant attributes [14, 15].
5
In this study, we solve the subspace discovery problem in order to balance privacy protec-
tion and outlier analysis. The found subspaces can be interpreted as knowledge to understand
why the points are outliers and how such outliers are generated. After identifying the subspaces
containing a large number of outliers, the number of the outliers are released. Our solutions
presented in the following sections guarantees differential privacy for both tasks.
3.1 Outlier Detection
In this study, we use distance-based outliers [16]. Presuming that records are real-valued
vectors, xi ∈ Rd, and letting X = {xi}Ni=1 denote the database, we let S ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}
denote a subspace. The Euclidean distance between x,y ∈ Rd in subspace S is denoted by
distS(x,y) =
√∑
i∈S(xi−yi)
2
|S| [14]. Then, the set of neighborhood vectors of x in subspace
S is defined as follows.
Definition 7 (Neighboring vector in subspace S). Let r > 0 and k ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Then, the
set of neighboring vectors of x ∈ S is
NS(X, r,x) = {x ∈ X|distS(x,y) ≤ r,x 6= y,y ∈ X}.
With this definition of the neighboring vectors, the outliers are defined as follows.
Definition 8 (Outliers in subspace S). Given threshold k and radius r, the set of outliers of X
in subspace S is
OS(X, k, r) = {x ∈ X||NS(X, r,x)| < k}.
Distance-based outliers are definable in this study with any type of object and distance
defined for the corresponding objects, but we presume that the objects are represented as real
vectors and that they use the Euclidean distance as the distance definition.
3.2 Queries for Outlier Analysis
As already discussed, we consider two tasks for outlier analysis, outlier count and subspace
discovery.
Let S ∈ 2{1,2,...,d} be a target subspace. Then, the task of outlier count is to find the number
outliers in subspace S:
qcount(X, k, r, S) = |OS(X, k, r)|.
If the subspace is not specified, O(X, k, r) denotes the set of outliers in the full dimension.
Let S ⊆ 2{1,2,...,d} be a subspaces. The task of top-h subspace discovery is to identify h
subspaces in S containing the h largest number of outliers:
qsubspace(X, k, r, h,S) = {Sπ(1), Sπ(2), . . . , Sπ(h)}
where π : {1, . . . , |S|} → {1, . . . , |S|} is a function that outputs the index of the subspace
ordered by qcount(X, k, r, S). For example, π(i) denotes the index of the subspace containing
the ith largest number of outliers.
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3.3 Differential privacy of Outlier Analysis
We introduce several typical scenarios of differentially private outlier analysis using the two
types of queries, qcount and qsubspace.
Scenario 1. Given threshold k and radius r, suppose the objective is to inspect that the
outliers exists in the given dataset. The analyst issues query z = qcount(X, k, r), and then
checking z > 0 yields the final result. Let z′ = qcount(X ′, k, r). For guarantee of (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy, we require, for ∀X ∼ X ′ and ∀t ∈ T ,
Pr[t = A(z)] ≤ eǫPr[t = A(z′)] + δ.
Scenario 2. Let data dimension be d = 3. Given threshold k and radius r, suppose the
objective is to identify the subspaces that cause the two largest number of outliers and learn
the number of outliers in the two discovered subspaces. Then, the target subspace set is S =
{{1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}}. The analyst issues query qsubspace(X, k, r, 2,S)
and obtains the two subspaces z1 = {Sπ(1), Sπ(2)}. For each subspace, the analyst issues
queries as z2 = qcount(X, k, r, Sπ(1)) and z3 = qcount(X, k, r, Sπ(2)). For guarantee of (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy, we require, for ∀X ∼ X ′ and ∀t ∈ T ,
Pr[t = A(z1, z2, z3)] ≤ eǫPr[t = A(z′1, z′2, z′3)] + δ,
where z′1, z′2, and z′3 are reposes learned from X ′ ∼ X.
4 Differentially Private Count of Outliers
As explained in this section, we investigate the problem of differentially private count of out-
liers in a given subspace. The discussion herein holds for any subspace including the full space.
Therefore, for this discussion, we presume that the outlier is counted in the full dimension.
4.1 Difficulties in Global Sensitivity Method
Analytical evaluation of the global sensitivity of determination of qcount is not trivial, partly
because it needs the kissing number. The kissing number Kd is the largest number of hy-
perspheres with same radius in Rd that can touch equivalent hyperspheres with no intersec-
tions [17, 18, 19]. The kissing numbers in d = 1 and d = 2 are readily derived respectively
as K1 = 2 and K2 = 6 (see Fig. 2 for K2 = 6). However, finding the kissing number in
d ≥ 3 is not trivial. In addition, the kissing number in general dimensions remains as an open
problem [17, 18, 19]. We derive the upper and lower bound of the global sensitivity of qcount
presuming that the kissing number in general dimensions is given.
Teorem 4 (Upper and lower bound on the global sensitivity of qcount). Let Kd be the kissing
number in Rd. Then, the upper and lower bound on the global sensitivity of qcount is
min(N, 2dk + 1) ≤ GSqcount,d(k) ≤ min(N, kKd + 1). (3)
Proof. The lower bound is trivial so we omit the proof. We show the proof for the upper
bound. In the problem of the kissing number, suppose the radius of the center hypersphere
and the hyperspheres touching the center hyperspheres (referred to as the surrounding hyper-
spheres) are r/2. The distance between the center point of the center hypersphere and those
7
 1
 10
 100
 1000
 10000
 100000
 1e+06
 0  5  10  15  20  25
lo
g(S
en
sit
ivi
ty)
Dimension
Lower bound
Upper bound
Figure 1: The bounds of the global sensitivity for counting outliers
of the surrounding hyperspheres are r. Noting that no intersection between the surrounding
hyperspheres does not exist, the distance between the center point of any two surrounding hy-
perspheres are equal to or greater than r (the equality holds if the two surrounding hyperspheres
are touching).
Suppose x0 be the center of the center hypersphere and x1 be the center of a surrounding
hypersphere that does not touch any other surrounding hyperspheres. We further suppose k−1
datapoints exist at exactly the same location as x1, that is, x1 = x2 = . . . = xk. Letting X =
{x0, x1, . . . , xk}, qcount(X, k, r) = 0 because all the k + 1 points are within a hypersphere
of radius r. If x0 is removed from X as X ′ = {x1, . . . , xk}, qcount(X, k, r) = k + 1 holds
because the remaining k points do not have k neighbor vectors and x0 itself can be an outlier
after moved.
By definition of the kissing number, the number of the surrounding hyperspheres that does
not touch mutually is at most Kd. By applying the setting described above for each surround-
ing hypersphere, we have a database that holds qcount(X, k, r) = 0, but after moving of x0,
qcount(X, k, r) = kKd + 1. Noting that no more hyperspheres cannot be packed around x0,
this is the upper bound of the outlier count.
We empirically investigate the tightness of the bound in low dimensions. In d = 1 and d =
2, the global sensitivity is given respectively as GSqcount,1(k) = 2k + 1 and GSqcount,2(k) =
5k + 1. Noting that K1 = 2 and K2 = 6, the bound is tight in d = 1 but not in d = 2. Fig. 1
shows the upper and lower bounds of the global sensitivity of qcount evaluated using known
upper bounds on the kissing number [17, 18, 19]. As the figure shows, the upper bound of
the global sensitivity grows exponentially with respect to the dimensionality, which indicates
that the guarantee of differential privacy by perturbation based on the global sensitivity can be
impractical, especially when the dimensionality of the target subspace is large.
The global sensitivity can be prohibitively large simply because the global sensitivity is
evaluated considering the worst case. However, one can typically expect that the number of
outliers in the database is much smaller than the number of instances. To improve the utility of
the count query, we introduce the smooth sensitivity, which is a sensitivity definition depending
on the database.
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Figure 2: This figure shows an example of the upper bound of the global sensitivity in two di-
mension. Six surrounding hyperspheres can be packed around the center hypersphere because the
kissing number is K2 = 6. We here suppose k datapoints exist at the center of each surrounding
hypersphere and no datapoint exists at x0, the center of the center hypersphere. Then, kK2 outliers
become inliers by adding a point to x0. Suppose the added point is an outlier, Then, the added
point can be changed from an outlier to an inlier, too. The upper bound of the global sensitivity for
two dimension is thus kK2 + 1 = 6k + 1.
4.2 Local Sensitivity and Smooth Sensitivity
For convenience of discussion later, several notations are introduced here. Given radius r,
deg(x) denotes the size of neighborhoods of x:
deg(X, r,x) = |N(X, r,x)|.
We say that the degree of x is k if deg(X, r,x) = k. A set of vectors in X whose degree is
exactly k is denoted as
V (X, k, r) = {x ∈ X : deg(x) = k}.
Unless specifically stated otherwise, the radius r and target database X is fixed. Therefore,
they are omitted as deg(x) and V (k). Finally, a set of degree-k neighborhoods of x in X is
denoted as
CV (X,x, k, r) = B(x, r) ∩ V (k),
where B(x, r) denotes the sphere with radius r and centered at x.
4.2.1 Local Sensitivity
Given database X, let X1 be a database s.t. H(X,X1) = 1. Then, following the definition of
the local sensitivity in Section 2.1.2, the local sensitivity of qcount is defined as
LS(0)qcount(X, k, r) = max
X1:H(X,X1)=1
‖qcount(X0, k, r)− qcount(X1, k, r)‖.
Exact evaluation of the exact local sensitivity is intractable. Instead, the following theorem
gives the upper bound of the local sensitivity.
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Teorem 5. Given X, the local sensitivity of qcount for X is bounded above as
LS(0)qcount(X, k, r) ≤ max
{
max
x∈X
{|CV (X,x, k, r)|},max
x∈D
{|CV (X,x, k − 1, r)|}
}
+ 1.
Proof. Intuitively, CV (X0,x, k, r) represents the set of non-outliers that become outliers if
x is removed; CV (X0,x, k − 1, r) is the set of outliers that become inliers if a vector is
placed at x. Thus, if vector x0 ∈ X0 is moved to x′0, the number of outliers increases by
|CV (X0,x0, k, r)| by removing x0 and the number of inliers decreases by |CV (X0,x′0, k −
1, r)| by adding x′0. With this understanding, the local sensitivity is given as:
LS(0)qcount(X0, k, r)
= max
X1:H(X0,X1)=1
‖qcount(X0, k, r) − qcount(X1, k, r)‖
≤ max
x0∈X0,x′0∈S
|CV (X0,x0, k, r) \ CV (X0,x′0, k − 1, r)|+ 1
≤ max
x0∈X0,x′0∈S
max
{|CV (X0,x0, k, r)|, |CV (X0,x′0, k − 1, r)|} + 1
=max
{
max
x∈X0
{CV (X0,x, k, r)},max
x
′
0
∈S
{CV (X0,x, k − 1, r)}
}
+ 1.
Naive evaluation of the local sensitivity is intractable. An algorithm to evaluate this upper
bound is presented in Section 4.3.
4.2.2 Smooth Sensitivity
Given database X, let Xt be a database s.t. H(X0,Xt) = t. By definition, the smooth
sensitivity of qcount is given as
S∗qcount(X) = maxt=0,1,...,n
e−tǫLS(t)qcount(X),
where
LS(t)qcount(X) = max
Xt:H(X,Xt)=t
LS(0)qcount(Xt).
Here, Xt denotes a database s.t. H(X,Xt) = t. The function LS(t)q (X) returns the largest lo-
cal sensitivity among the datasets of which t records differ from X. Similarly to LS(0)qcount(X),
exact evaluation of LS(t)qcount(X) is intractable because the variation of Xt can increase ex-
ponentially with respect to t. Instead, we derive the upper bound on LS(t)qcount(X) using
CV (X,x, k, r).
Teorem 6. Given X, for t ≥ 0, LS(t)qcount(X) is bounded above as
LS(t)qcount(X) ≤ max
x∈D
{
max{C(t)(X,x, k, r), C(t)(X,x, k − 1, r)} + t+ 1
}
, (4)
where
C(t)(X,x, k, r) =
∣∣∣∣∣
t⋃
i=−t
CV (X,x, k + i, r)
∣∣∣∣∣ .
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For the proof of this theorem, we use the following helper lemma.
Lemma 1. Let t ≥ 0 be an integer, and let X and Xt be databases such that H(X,Xt) = t.
Then, for any x ∈ D, threshold k, and radius r,
|CV (Xt,x, k, r)| ≤
∣∣∣∣∣
t⋃
i=−t
CV (X,x, k + i, r)
∣∣∣∣∣+ t.
Proof of Lemma 1. We first consider the case t = 1. Suppose x ∈ X is moved from x to x1,
and X1 is given as X1 = X \ {x} ∪ {x1}. The degree of records in X \ {x} around x is
decreased by one by removing x, and the degree of records in X \ {x} around x1 is increased
by one by adding x1. Since the degree of the records in V (X, k + 1, r) and V (X, k − 1, r)
may become k in X1, V (X1, k, r) is thus a subset of V (X, k+1, r)∪V (X, k, r)∪ V (X, k−
1, r) ∪ {x1}. When t > 1, for the same reason, V (Xt, k, r) is a subset of
⋃t
i=−t V (X, k +
i, r)∪{x1,x2, ...,xt} where x1, ...,xt are the records moved from X to Xt. Thus, the size of
CV (Xt,x, r, k) is bounded above as
|CV (Xt,x, r, k)| ≤
∣∣∣∣∣B(x, r) ∩
t⋃
i=−t
V (X, k + i, r) ∪ {x1,x2, ...,xt}
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣
t⋃
i=−t
B(x, r) ∩ V (X, k + i, r)
∣∣∣∣∣+ |{x1,x2, ...,xt}|
≤
∣∣∣∣∣
t⋃
i=−t
CV (X,x, k + i, r)
∣∣∣∣∣+ t.
By using Lemma 1, we now prove the Theorem 6.
Proof of Theorem 6. As proved in Theorem 5, the local sensitivity of the query qcount is
bounded above by
LS(0)qcount(X) ≤ max{max
x∈X
|CV (X,x, r, k)|,max
x∈D
|CV (X,x, k − 1, r)|}+ 1.
From exchangeability of max, letting
C
(t)
out(X, k, r) = max
Xt:H(X,Xt)=t
max
x∈Xt
|CV (Xt,x, r, k)|, and
C
(t)
in (X, k − 1, r) = max
Xt:H(X,Xt)=t
max
x∈D
|CV (Xt,x, r, k − 1)|,
yields
LS(t)qcount(X) ≤ max{C
(t)
out(X, k, r), C
(t)
in (X, k − 1, r)}+ 1. (5)
C
(t)
out(X, k, r) can be bounded above using C
(t)
in (X, k − 1, r) as
C
(t)
out(X, k, r) = max
Xt:H(X,Xt)=t
max
x∈Xt
|CV (Xt,x, r, k)|
≤ max
Xt:H(X,Xt)=t
max
x∈D
|CV (Xt,x, r, k)|
=C
(t)
in (X, k, r). (6)
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Here, we use the fact that X ′ ⊂ D. By Lemma 1, we have
C
(t)
in (X, k, r) ≤max
x∈D
∣∣∣∣∣
t⋃
i=−t
CV (X,x, k + i, r)
∣∣∣∣∣+ t. (7)
By substituting eqs. 6 and 7 into eq. (5), we get the claim.
4.3 Efficient Computation of Smooth Sensitivity Bound
For randomization by the mechanism of Theorem 1, it is necessary to evaluate the smooth
upper bound. Naive evaluation of the smooth upper bound of eq. (4) is intractable because it
requires an exhaustive search over continuous domain to evaluate LS(t)qcount(X). To alleviate
this, we first show an efficient algorithm that evaluates the upper bound of LS(t)qcount(X) shown
derived by Theorem 6. Then using the algorithm, we derive the algorithm that calculates the
smooth sensitivity upper bound.
4.3.1 Algorithm for local sensitivity bound
To evaluate the upper bound of LS(t)qcount(X), we need to calculate
max
x∈D
C(t)(X,x, k, r) =max
x∈D
∣∣∣∣∣
t⋃
i=−t
V (X, k + i, r) ∩B(x, r)
∣∣∣∣∣ , and (8)
max
x∈D
C(t)(X,x, k − 1, r) =max
x∈D
∣∣∣∣∣
t⋃
i=−t
V (X, k + i− 1, r) ∩B(x, r)
∣∣∣∣∣ . (9)
Letting P =
⋃t
i=−t V (X, k + i, r) (resp. P =
⋃t
i=−t V (X, k + i− 1, r)), we can obtain
the value of eq.(8) (resp. eq.(9)) by finding the largest subset C ⊆ P that is enclosed by a
ball with radius r. To check whether or not a given subset C ⊆ P is enclosed by the ball, we
use the algorithm that solves the smallest enclosing ball (seb) problem [20]. The goal of the
problem is to find the smallest ball that encloses the given points. The given subset C ⊆ P is
enclosed by a ball with radius r if seb(C) ≤ r where seb(C) denotes the radius of the resultant
ball of the smallest enclosing ball problem of C .
Algorithm 1 shows the recursive algorithm that calculates eq. (8) or eq. (9) for given
P =
⋃t
i=−t V (X, k + i, r) or P =
⋃t
i=−t V (X, k + i − 1, r). P [i] denotes the i-th element
of the set P . Algorithm 1 searches for the largest subsets C ⊆ P that is enclosed by a ball
with radius r with the breadth-first search. In the algorithm, the calls of seb can be skipped for
efficiency by using the fact that the radius of the enclosing ball of C2 is larger than one of C1
if C1 ⊆ C2 ⊆ P . The computational cost of Algorithm 1 is O(2|P |) of the calls of seb.
4.3.2 Algorithm for smooth sensiticity bound.
Algorithm 1 costs exponential time with respect to |P | and the size of P increases mono-
tonically as t increases. However, because of exponential decrease of e−tβ , maximization of
e−tβLS
(t)
qcount(X) is attained by small t in most cases. Taking account of this property, we
provide Algorithm 2 that calculates the smooth sensitivity bound with avoiding evaluation of
LS
(t)
qcount(X) of large t.
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Algorithm 1: Calculation of maxx∈D C(t)(X,x, k, r)(eq. (8) and eq. (9))
Input: Records P and radius r.
Output: The value of eq.(8) or eq.(9).
Initialization: C = ∅ and i = 1
1 Function E(r, P, C, i)
2 br ← 0
3 if C 6= ∅ then
4 br ← seb(C)
5 end
6 if br ≤ r then
7 m← |C|
8 if i ≤ |P | then
9 b1 ← E(r, P, C ∪ {P [i]}, i+ 1)
10 b2 ← E(r, P, C, i+ 1)
11 m← max{m, b1, b2}
12 end
13 return m
14 end
15 else
16 return 0
17 end
18 end
Proposition 1. For any t and t′ < t, LS(t)qcount is bounded above as
LS(t)qcount(X) ≤ min{N,max{U
(t)
t′ (X, k, r), U
(t)
t′ (X, k − 1, r)}+ t+ 1},
where
U
(t)
t′ (X, k, r) = max
x∈D
C(t
′)(X,x, k, r) +
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
i∈{−t,...,−t′−1}∪{t′+1,...,t}
V (X, k + i, r)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
Sketch of proof. For any database X, because the number of outliers does not exceed the num-
ber of the records in X, the local sensitivity is less than N . In addition, using the fact that
CV (X,x, k, r) ⊆ V (X, k, r) for any x ∈ D, we can derive maxx∈D C(t)(X,x, k, r) ≤
U
(t)
t′ (X, k, r) for any t and t′ < t.
Using the bound in Proposition 1, we have the upper bound of e−tβLS(t)qcount(X) as
e−tβLS(t)qcount(X) ≤e−tβ min{N,max{U (t)t′ (X, k, r), U (t)t′ (X, k − 1, r)} + t+ 1}
:=St
′,t
UB(X).
Letting StUB(X) = maxi=1,...,N−t S
t,t+i
UB (X), we can obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If there exists UT such that maxt=0,...,T e−tβLS(t)qcount(X) ≤ UT and STUB(X) ≤
UT , then S∗qcount(X) ≤ UT .
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Algorithm 2: Calculation of the smooth sensitivity of qcount
Input: Database X , threshold k, radius r and smooth parameter ǫ.
Output: The smooth sensitivity upper bound of query qcount for database X .
Initialization: Smax = 0 and
maxx∈D C
(−1)(X,x, k, r) = maxx∈D C
(−1)(X,x, k − 1, r) = 0.
1 for t = 0 to N do
2 Calculate St−1UB by Proposition 2
3 if St−1UB ≤ Smax then
4 return Smax
5 end
6 Smax ← max{Smax, e−tβLS(t)qcount(X)}
7 Store maxx∈D C(t)(X,x, k, r) and maxx∈D C(t)(X,x, k − 1, r) for calculating StUB in
next loop
8 end
9 return Smax
Proof. If STUB(X) = maxi=1,...,N−T ST,T+iUB (X) ≤ UT , since e−tβLS(t)qcount(X) ≤ ST,tUB(X)
for any t > T , we have e−tβLS(t)qcount(X) ≤ UT ,∀t > T . Thus, we have maxt=0,...,T e−tβLS(t)qcount(X) ≤
UT and maxt>T e−tβLS(t)qcount(X) ≤ UT .
Proposition 2 shows that if the largest upper bound in Theorem 6 for t = 0, ..., T can be
bounded above by STUB(X), then the calculation of the upper bound in Theorem 6 for t > T
can be skipped. Algorithm 2 shows the calculation of the smooth sensitivity of qcount with this
skip by following Proposition 2.
5 Differentially Private Discovery and Detection
We are able to get the number of outliers in the database while ensuring (ǫ, δ)-differential
mechanism by previous technique. Next, we try to achieve analyzing like Scenario 2 and 3.
We descrive how to achieve Scenario 2 in Section 5.1 and Scenario 3 in Section ??.
5.1 Top-h Subspace Discovery with Exponential Mechanism
This section investigates differential privacy for finding subspaces that contains outliers. As
already discussed, identification of outliers and protecting privacy of instances are intrinsi-
cally incompatible. However, if the interest of the analyst is simply to learn the situations that
the outliers appear, we can alleviate releasing the outlier counts on each subspace; releasing
subspaces containing many outliers would suffice [12]. In this section, we present another
mechanism for differential privacy that allows us to learn top-h subspaces that contains out-
liers.
The subspace containing many outliers can be simply found by issuing count queries for
each subspace. However, responses obtained with such a procedure can be useless in typical
settings. Let Fc be the set of subspaces spanned by c dimensions. Then, the privacy parameters
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need to be set as (ǫ/|S|, δ/|S|) for each count query so that the entire process achieves (ǫ, δ)-
differentially private because of sequential composition. The privacy budget can be saved by
applying the more sophisticated composition theorem [21]. However, noting that the size of
Fc can grow exponentially in d, it is still difficult to manage high dimensionality.
We consider the problem of the top-h subspace discovery by means of the exponential
mechanism, which allows us to avoid releasing outlier counts for each subspace. Let d be the
instance dimension and let E = {1, 2, · · · , d}. Then, the set of c-dimensional subspaces is
denoted as Fc = {Fc|Fc ⊂ E, |Fc| = c}. Given c and E, the top-h subspace discovery is the
problem to find the h subspaces in Fc containing the h largest number of outliers. The expo-
nential mechanism can be used to release discrete values with achieving differential privacy.
We employ the following function as the utility function for the top-h subspace discovery:
usubspace(X, r, k, S) =
qcount(X, k, r, S)
GSUBqcount,|S|(k)
where GSUBqcount,|S|(k) denotes the upper bound of the global sensitivity of the count query,
as derived by eq. (3) in Section 4.1. The following theorem denotes the differential privacy
achieved by the exponential mechanism with this utility function.
Teorem 7. The exponential mechanism with utility function usubspace achieves 2ǫ-differential
privacy.
Proof. The global sensitivity of utility function usubspace is given as
∆usubspace = max
S∈Fc
max
X,X′∈Dn:H(X,X′)=1
||usubspace(X, k, r, S) − usubspace(X ′, k, r, S)||
= max
S∈Fc
max
X,X′∈Dn:H(X,X′)=1
||qcount(X, k, r, S) − qcount(X ′, k, r, S)||
GSUBqcount,|S|(k)
=
GSqcount,|S|(k)
GSUBqcount,|S|(k)
≤ 1.
Hence, we have ∆usubspace ≤ 1. The exponential mechanism with utility function usubspace
thus achieves 2ǫ∆usubspace-differential privacy, which concludes the proof.
To obtain the top-h (suspected) subspaces, we need to iterate the exponential mechanism
until h different subspaces are found. Algorithm 3 denotes the entire procedure for the top-h
query with ǫ-differential privacy. Therefore, top-h discovery of subspace query could also be
adupted. At line 2-4, the utility for each subspaces in Fc are evaluated. At line 5-10, h sub-
spaces are chosen by iterative application of exponential mechanism ǫǫ/husubspace . Finally, the se-
lected subspaces are released. Note that the privacy parameter for the exponential mechanism
is set to ǫ/h so that the entire procedure of the top-h subspace discovery achieves ǫ-differential
privacy.
6 Experiments
In this section, we show the empirical evaluation of the utility of the mechanism for counting
outliers query, discovery of subspace query and detection of outlier query.
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Algorithm 3: Mechanism of Top-h Query
Input: Top-h query qh and smooth parameter ǫ.
Output: The top-h items Rh.
Initialization: Rh ← ∅
1 Function qh(R, h, ·)
2 for r ∈ R do
3 calculate the utility of a item r by uh(r, ·)
4 end
5 while |Rh| < h do
6 repeat
7 r ← ǫǫ/huh,∆uh
8 until r /∈ Rh
9 Rh ← {r} ∪ Rh
10 end
11 return Rh
12 end
6.1 Settings
We conducted the experiments on some synthetic and real datasets for Scenario 1 and Scenario
2. As real datasets, we used Adult and Ionosphere datasets chosen from UCI Machine Learning
Repository [22] which are originally prepared for classification tasks. For adapting outlier
analysis, we carried out the preprocessing to the datasets in the same manner of [23, 24]. These
datasets were scaled so that the average and variance of each attribute is 0 and 1, respectively.
For Adult, we removed two categorical attributes, “category” and “fnlwgt”.
The experiments for Scenario 1 were carried out on the two datasets, named Synthetic 1
and Adult 1. Synthetic 1 consists of 50 samples of 2 dimensional real vectors, which contains
45 inliers and 5 outliers. The inliers are sampled from N (0, I) where I represents an identity
matrix, and the outliers are sampled from N (µ,Σ) where µ1 = µ2 = 20, and Σ is a diagonal
matrix such that Σ11 = Σ22 = 100. Adult 1 is a subset of the original Adult dataset which
contains 45 positive labeled samples and 5 negative labeled samples. The positive labeled
samples and the negative labeled samples are treated as inliers and outliers, respectively (See
Table 1 for the detail).
The experiments for Scenario 2 were conducted on the three datasets, named Synthetic 2,
Adult 2 and Ionosphere. Synthetic 2 consists of 500 samples of 10 dimensional real vectors.
The dataset contains 490 inliers sampled from N (0, I) and 10 outliers sampled from N (µ,Σ)
where µ1 = µ2 = 20, µi = 0 for i = 3..., 10, I represents an identity matrix, and Σ is
a diagonal matrix such that Σ11 = Σ22 = 100 and Σii = 1 for i = 3..., 10. Adult 2 and
Ionosphere are subsets of the original Adult or Ionosphere datasets which contains 490 positive
labeled samples and 10 negative labeled samples in Adult 2, and 225 positive labeled samples
and 10 negative labeled samples in Ionosphere. The treatment of inliers and outliers in real
datasets is same as the experiments for Scenario 1 (See Table 2 for the detail).
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Table 1: Sumarry of datasets and parametas for Scenario 1
Synthetic 1 Adult 1
The number of outliers 5 5
The number of inliers 45 45
The number of samples N 50 50
Dimension d 2 7
Treshold k 3 3
Radious r 1.1 0.35
Table 2: Sumarry of datasets and parametas for Scenario 2 and Scenario 3
Synthetic 2 Adult 2 Ionosphere
The number of outliers 10 10 10
The number of inliers 490 369 225
The number of samples N 500 379 235
Dimension d 10 7 34
Treshold k 3 3 3
Radious r 0.13 0.02 0.06
6.2 Count Outliers
Following the Scenario 1 described in Section 3.3, we evaluated the utility of the mechanisms
of qcount on the synthetic dataset. We changed the privacy parameter from ǫ = 0.1 to 0.9;
δ was fixed as δ = 0.01. See Table 1 for the parameters of the outliers. We partitioned the
instances into two classes: one is “true”, indicating the instance detected as an outlier; the
other is “false”. For each dataset, we tuned the radius r so that the Accuracy given by eq.(10)
is maximized:
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + FP + FN + TN
, (10)
where TP , TN , FP and FN respectively denote true positive, true negative, false positive,
and false negative. For implementation, we used [25] to solve the smallest enclosing ball
problem. As the criterion of the utility of the mechanisms, we show the standard deviation
of the noise added to the query. We compared the standard deviation of the noise of the
mechanism based on the smooth sensitivity upper bound in eq.(4) with the mechanism based
on the global sensitivity lower bound in eq.(3). Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show true the number of
outliers in the database and the standard deviations (σGlobal and σSmooth) of the gaussian for
each ǫ. In Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, “Global” and “Smooth” respectively present the global sensitivity-
based mechanism and the smooth sensitivity-based mechanism.
It is apparent that the standard deviation of the noise of the smooth sensitivity-based mech-
anism is significantly lower than that of the global sensitivity-based mechanism. Indeed, the
standard deviation of the noise of global sensitivity-based mechanism is approximately 10-
30 times larger than that of the smooth sensitivity-based mechanism even though the global
sensitivity-based mechanism uses the lower bound. In addition, the smooth sensitivity-based
mechanism achieves the noise of which standard deviation is lower than 7 for ǫ ≥ 0.7 for each
datasets. The reason why we got these results is our approach depends only on the number
of outliers, not on the number of dimensions. From these results, we can conclude that our
framework is sufficiently practical in this setting.
17
O
u
tl
ie
r 
C
o
u
n
ts
O
u
tl
ie
r 
C
o
u
n
ts
-1200
-900
-600
-300
0
300
600
900
1200
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Figure 3: The result of Synthetic 1 on Scenario 1
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Figure 4: The result of Adult 1 on Scenario 1
6.3 Top-h Subspace Discovery
The experiments of top-h subspace discovery shown in this subsection follow Scenario 2 of
Section 3.3. The analyst investigates the subspace contains more outliers using query qsubspace.
In these experiments, the dimensionality of the subspace is set as 1; the analyst tries to detect
2 out of 10 subspaces by top-h Subspace discovery.
For evaluation purposes, we partitioned the subspace into two classes: one is “true”, in-
dicating the subspace containing outliers; the other is “false”. The utility of the results is
measured from the precision and recall. The precision is evaluated by precision = TPTP+FP ,
where TP and FP respectively denote true positive and false positive. The recall is evaluated
by recall = TPTP+FN , where FN denotes false negative. The prediction and recall are one
thousand times average. Privacy parameter was varied from ǫ = 0.2 to 3.2.
Fig. 5-7 (left) and Fig. 5-7 (right) respectively represent the precision and recall, with
changing h, the number of subspaces detecting. The precision decreases as h grows, as shown
in Fig. 5. The recall can be improved with larger h because the probability with which true
subspaces are chosen increases. Because of sequential decomposition, the outputs of the ex-
ponential mechanism become noisy as h increases. Therefore, the recall can be decreased if
the effect of noise is dominant. As Fig. 5 shows, the effect of sequential composition was
more dominant and smaller h achieved larger recall in this experiments. However there isn’t
distinctive subspace that has many outliers. It is difficult to apply top-h subspace discovery
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Figure 5: The result of Synthetic 2 on Scenario 2
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Figure 6: The result of Adult 1 on Scenario 2
when the difference of the number of ouliers are not.
For practical use, the precision and recall are preferred to be much higher than 1/2. If the
number of true subspaces can be known by analysts in advance, then h should be set as small as
possible. Privacy parameter ǫ and utility (precision and recall) share a tradeoff relation. Noting
that the objective of outlier analysis is fundamentally conflicting with privacy protection, the
choice of larger ǫ, such as 0.8 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1.6, might be allowed.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we present the differentially private distance-based outlier analysis that consists
of two different types of queries, the differentially private counting of outliers in given sub-
space and the differentially private discovery of subspaces.
For the query of counting of outliers, taking advantage of the smooth sensitivity [2], the
resulting output of the mechanism can be less noisy than that of the global sensitivity based
mechanism. Although the evaluation of the smooth upper bound is often costly, we provide
an efficient algorithm for evaluation of the smooth upper bound for the problem for outlier
counting. This paper describes an initial step towards differentially private outlier analysis, and
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Figure 7: The result of Ionosphere on Scenario 2
the experimental evaluation is performed with relatively small-size datasets. In our algorithm,
we invoke the smallest enclosing ball algorithm that takes as input the power set of instances.
Because of this construction, we need a more efficient algorithm for application to larger size
datasets.
For the query of discovery of subspaces, we employ the exponential mechanism and specif-
ically design a utility function. Even though the variation of subspaces can grow exponentially
in the data dimensionality, the proposed mechanism achieves better detection accuracy for high
dimensionality.
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